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equality! Give religion this place of supremacy, and it will lift all life to a higher level. The effect of thus exalting religion to the highest place is not, however, as in the ancient and mediæval schemes, to set men wishing for a Beyond, but to lift human life into conscious and joyful participation in an "independent spiritual order, transcending alike the world and time," and conceived as revealing the ultimate depths of reality. The lack of definiteness in Eucken's setting forth of this leading concept is hard to excuse, as in the study of his larger works. The result of accepting the spiritual as supreme is a "complete reversal of valuation." In thus emphasizing religion as concerned primarily with values, Eucken ranges himself with the Ritschlians, and gives a handle to those critics who insist that his philosophy is incurably romantic.

One's doubts regarding this stimulating book are doubts that arise concerning Eucken's position in philosophy as a whole. His wavering and indistinct treatment of such controlling concepts as nature and humanity, and, above all, the "spiritual life"; his lack of concrete reference, making the checking of many statements impossible; his acknowledged irrationalism and mystical absolutism; force one who has been an admirer and who acknowledges a great debt to question whether his day is not already past, with that of Fichte and Hegel. A more relativistic and realistic type of thinking is coming to the front, which will be more specific in its routing of old ghosts from their places in the superstitious reverence of the multitude. Well will it be for this coming philosophy if it can stir conviction and arouse the impulse to action with as noble zeal and high fervor as did, in its long and stirring day, the absolutism of the great disciples of Kant, of whom Eucken is doubtless not the last and surely not the least.

RICHARD WILSON BOYNTON.

FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH, BUFFALO, N.Y.

FATED OR FREE. A DIALOGUE ON DESTINY. PRESTON WILLIAM SLOSSON.  
Sherman, French, & Co. 1914. Pp. vi, 89.

This dialogue aims to be a fair presentation of the arguments in favor of and against free will. The sympathies of the author are evidently on the side of the indeterminist, who stands quite alone in the little drama against the professor of logic, the professor of physics, the professor of sociology, the Presbyterian minister, the novelist, the warden of the State penitentiary, and the man of practical affairs, all of whom proclaim the arguments of determinism

Of course, the denial of freedom which the physicist develops is very different from that of the minister and again from that of the criminologist, but all agree that freedom of the will is an impossible doctrine. Everyone of these opponents of free will—Professor Huxley Kohlenstoff, Dr. Clifford Denker, Rev. Edwards C. Gottlieb, Mr. Javerts Lawes, Mr. Meredith Riter—receives his eloquent reply from Mr. James B. Freeman the indeterminist. The questions which they try to settle begin with the naturalistic problem of whether there can be cause and effect if the will is free, and whether the reality of free will would affect natural science. Then they discuss the inner experience of freedom and the psychology of the will. From here they turn to the influence of heredity and environment. The following question refers to the practical importance of the belief in free will. Finally we stand before the religious inquiry: Can God rule if man is free?

The author does not claim to discuss the great question with the fulness it deserves or any special originality in the arguments on either side. But it may be acknowledged that he presents more or less familiar arguments in a lucid and interesting form. The irony of the book, however, lies in the fact that the objections to free will are far better presented than the case for freedom, which is evidently the side on which the author himself wishes to take his stand. The book makes us believe that James B. Freeman has effectively answered the arguments of his opponents. No doubt, he has answered some and has swept aside some others by enthusiasm and an expression of faith in freedom, but he has probably convinced neither Mr. Kohlenstoff nor Mr. Gottlieb nor even Mr. Lawes.

Yet is that really the fault of the cause which he defends? It seems rather a hopeless undertaking to make a fight for freedom if the idea of freedom is taken in the narrow and unsatisfactory sense in which the author proclaims it. To him the free will is a kind of psychological energy which the organisms have acquired at a late stage of natural evolution. He says directly: "The indeterminism of today is a critical philosophy which would not have been possible before Darwin, and most of the arguments for it depend upon the progress in psychology during the past twenty-five years." Hence the whole discussion starts on both sides alike with the epistemological presupposition that reality as the natural scientist describes it to us is the only possible object of interest and perception the only form of experience. A freedom which is a break in the chain of causality in the midst of a causal world is certainly contrary to the presuppositions of thought itself. If we start to conceive our world of impres-

sions under the thought-form of causality, it would be contradictory to accept as a part of this world a process which is on principle without causes. If we want to reach the world of freedom we must certainly go back to the fundamental conditions of experience, and recognize that reality seen under the category of causality is not the only form of existence. We know our own will and the will of our neighbors primarily in an entirely different form. We know it not by perceiving it but by willing it. In an attitude of affirming and denying we are aware of a reality which is absolutely different from that of the objects of awareness, and we reach the will of others not by perceiving them but by acknowledging them, by agreeing or disagreeing with them. A world of will-relations opens itself, in which the objects of nature come in question only as material for the will, as means and as ends. This is the true world of our historical and our practical life. In this world of will-relations are lying our logical, ethical, æsthetic, and religious ideals and obligations. It is a world that is just as complete in itself as that which the scientist builds up by his conceptional reconstruction of the impressions. But it is a world which cannot possibly be brought under the categories of causality; and just because there is no meaning in asking for the causes of the will in such a teleological world, the will as part of this true world of historical existence is free. At various points the arguments of the determinists and of the indeterminist in Slosson's book hint at this true world of freedom. But they completely fail to see its fundamental meaning, and therefore remain on principle at a level of thought at which freedom is fundamentally a problem for the biological laboratory-student and not for the philosopher.

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

BIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. GEORGE H. PARKER. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xx, 130. \$1.10.

This volume presents in book form the William Brewster Clark Memorial Lectures delivered at Amherst College in 1914, by the Professor of Zoölogy in Harvard University. The first chapter deals with the structure and function of the nervous system, concerning which Professor Parker is a leading American authority. The second chapter emphasizes the importance of internal secretions or hormones upon the nervous and other functions, supplementing the action of the nervous system and affecting the temperament of the individual. The third chapter summarizes the more important recent discoveries in heredity, and points out the bearing of these